The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to Net Neutrality Regulation by Lyons, Daniel A.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
July 2010
The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to Net
Neutrality Regulation
Daniel Lyons
Boston College Law School, daniel.lyons.2@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Communications Law Commons, Internet Law
Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Lyons. "The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to Net Neutrality Regulation." Perspectives from FSF Scholars 5, no.20 (2010).
  
The Free State Foundation 
P.O. Box 60680, Potomac, MD 20859 
info@freestatefoundation.org   
 www.freestatefoundation.org 
 
 
Perspectives from FSF Scholars 
July 30, 2010 
Vol. 5, No. 20 
The Coming Fifth Amendment Challenge to 
Net Neutrality Regulation 
 
by 
 
Daniel A. Lyons* 
 The Federal Communications Commission continues to press ahead in its effort 
to impose net neutrality restrictions on broadband providers.  Since President Obama‟s 
election and the subsequent appointment of Chairman Julius Genachowski to head the 
agency, the Commission has moved inexorably toward a policy that would limit the 
discretion of broadband providers such as Verizon and Comcast to regulate the terms 
under which Internet content providers such as Google and Hulu may access their 
networks.  At stake is control over what Chairman Genachowski calls the “onramp to the 
Internet,” the network of wires through which information flows from the Internet to end-
user consumers. 
Earlier this year, the D.C. Circuit invalidated the Commission‟s first attempt to 
regulate a broadband provider‟s network management practices and admonished the 
Commission to “act only pursuant to authority delegated to [it] by Congress.”1  
Undeterred, the Commission now seeks comment, under the rubric of a proposed "Third 
Way" regulatory regime, on whether it should reclassify broadband Internet service as a 
“telecommunications service” subject to common carriage obligations under Title II of 
the Communications Act, rather than as an “information service” subject to minimal 
regulation under Title I.2  The consequence—indeed, the explicit goal—of this proposed 
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reclassification would be to overturn the court‟s decision and impose binding 
nondiscrimination obligations on broadband Internet providers. 
 The economic and other policy difficulties presented by net neutrality have been 
well-canvassed in the literature, including in previous editions of Free State Foundation 
Perspectives.  Opponents have also argued that such restrictions violate broadband 
providers‟ First Amendment speech rights.3  But there is an additional constitutional 
implication of net neutrality that has not yet been sufficiently addressed in this debate: 
the Takings Clause. 
 Under the Supreme Court‟s Takings Clause jurisprudence, the Commission‟s 
proposed actions effect a permanent physical occupation of private broadband networks 
and therefore take broadband network providers‟ property without just compensation.  In 
essence, net neutrality would grant content and application providers a permanent 
virtual easement across privately-owned broadband networks.  It thus would deprive 
broadband providers of the right to exclude others from their networks—a right that the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly dubbed “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property.”4 
 At the very least, the Takings Clause issue raises a serious constitutional 
question regarding the Commission‟s authority to adopt net neutrality regulations 
without clear authority from Congress.  These doubts, coupled with all the other legal 
and policy concerns which have been raised regarding net neutrality mandates, should 
cause the FCC to pull back from its current course.   
Permanent Physical Occupation Takings 
Over 85 years ago, the Court recognized that a regulation that goes “too far” can 
constitute a taking for which just compensation is owed, even if the owner retains title 
and some use rights in its property.5  These “regulatory takings” are usually governed 
by the three-part Penn Central test, named for a Supreme Court case involving the 
regulation of air rights over New York‟s Grand Central Terminal.  The Penn Central test 
balances (1) the economic impact of the regulation and (2) its interference with the 
owner‟s reasonable investment-backed expectations against (3) the nature of the 
government‟s action.6  The government typically wins these Penn Central cases, 
because courts usually accord the government‟s interest far greater weight than that of 
the private landowner.  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[g]overnment hardly 
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without 
paying for every such change in the general law.”7 
But in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corporation,8 the Supreme 
Court created a per se exemption from the Penn Central test.  Loretto involved a New 
York regulation that required landlords to grant cable companies to place equipment on 
their properties, without charging more than a nominal fee.  In Loretto‟s case, the cable 
company permanently installed a box on the rooftop of Loretto‟s building and a cable 
that ran down the side of the building.  The Court found that the regulation constituted a 
permanent physical occupation of the owner‟s property.  Justice Thurgood Marshall, 
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who was not generally known as a proponent of either bright-line rules or strong 
property rights, nonetheless wrote for the majority that “[s]uch an appropriation is 
perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner‟s property interests.”9  As a 
result, he explained, such a regulation constitutes “a taking without regard to the public 
interests that it may serve.”10  In other words, such an occupation is a taking without 
having to balance the owner‟s loss against the government‟s interest.  
Loretto thus draws a constitutional distinction between compelled permanent 
physical occupation cases and more traditional regulations on an owner‟s use rights.  
As one commentator notes, “[t]he operative fact in such cases is that the government is 
appropriating the use of the property for the benefit of the public.”11  The Supreme Court 
later explained that the line separating a typical regulation from a Loretto taking is 
“unambiguous distinction between a commercial lessee and an interloper with a 
government license.”12  When a regulation grants the government or a third-party a 
permanent access right to private property over the objection of the owner, the Fifth 
Amendment demands that compensation be paid. 
Net Neutrality As a Permanent Physical Occupation Taking 
 Even the most straightforward telecommunications regulation can be a study in 
opaque, jargon-laden decisionmaking.  But once stripped of its technical façade and 
reduced to more conventional property terms, net neutrality becomes little more than an 
effort by the Commission to transform “commercial licensees” into “interlopers with a 
government license.”  Net neutrality would allow content providers such as Google or 
Hulu to transmit material across privately-owned broadband networks from the Internet 
to individual end-users, with or without the network owner‟s consent.  Chairman 
Genachowski often describes these broadband networks as the “onramp to the 
Internet.”  But it is perhaps more accurate to describe them as the Internet‟s “offramp”, 
as the focus is on the flow of information not from the consumer to the Internet, but from 
the Internet to the consumer.  In essence, a content provider that has uploaded 
information to the Internet would receive an unlimited, continuous right of access to use 
those privately-owned network “offramps” to deliver that information to consumers.  This 
access allows content providers to physically invade these “offramps” with their 
electronic signals and to permanently occupy space on those networks, all without 
having to pay the network owner for access.  The effect is to appropriate the use of 
these private networks for the public‟s benefit, in the form of unfettered and 
nondiscriminatory access to the content and applications of the consumer‟s choosing, 
without a process for requiring the payment of just compensation.   
To draw a parallel to real property law, content providers would receive the 
equivalent of a virtual easement to traverse broadband providers‟ networks.  In Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission,13 the Supreme Court explained that the imposition of an 
easement across a privately-held beach would unquestionably constitute a Loretto 
taking, even though it meant that different members of the public might occupy different 
parts of the property at any given time.  “„[P]ermanent physical occupation‟ has 
occurred, for purposes of that rule, where individuals are given a permanent and 
continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property may continuously be 
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traversed, even though no particular individual is permitted to station himself 
permanently upon the premises.”14 
Some may object that the “property” in question is an electronic network rather 
than land or a building, but this distinction is irrelevant.  As an initial matter, Loretto has 
never been limited to real property.  For example, when Congress forced Richard Nixon 
to grant the public access to his presidential papers, the courts did not hesitate to hold 
that a Loretto taking had occurred.15  Similarly, when the Federal Communications 
Commission forced public utilities to allow cable companies to install lines on their 
telephone poles, the Eleventh Circuit held that Loretto required compensation.16 
But more importantly, as a factual matter, the transmission of content over 
broadband networks is not some metaphysical act.  It takes place in a real physical 
space: the fiber-optic and copper wires, and associated electronics, that comprise the 
broadband network.  Transmission of Internet content primarily involves the movement 
of electrons (which are physical particles) that occupy rivalrous limited space on 
telecommunications wires en route from the Internet to the end-user consumer.  While 
the electrons are invisible to the naked eye and travel very quickly within a sheathed 
wire, the physical act of transmission is nothing more than a microscopic version of 
vehicles traveling along a highway—or pedestrians traversing an easement. In other 
words, the mandatory transmissions do physically occupy the service providers' 
property. 
Distinguishing Common Carriage  
Proponents may also argue that the proposed rules are simply a species of 
common carriage obligations, which generally have withstood Fifth Amendment 
scrutiny.  The Supreme Court has explained that a regulatory takings claim would not lie 
if the regulation at issue stems from the background norms that the common law has 
traditionally placed on property.  In such a case, no taking can occur because the law 
has not “taken” anything from the property owner.  Rather, if the common law never 
recognized the right at issue, then it was never the owner‟s to begin with. 
But upon closer examination, in this instance, this defense collapses.  To avail 
itself of this safe harbor, the Commission must show that net neutrality “do[es] no more 
than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts” under a common 
law property claim, or otherwise make explicit a limitation implied in the owner‟s title by 
“existing rules or understandings.”17  Net neutrality goes far beyond whatever limitations 
common carriage norms placed upon network providers at common law. 
First, it is not clear that broadband providers are the kind of service providers that 
would have been subjected to common carriage obligations at common law.  At 
common law, common carriage was usually (though not always) imposed on companies 
that had market power and had the incentive and ability to abuse it, such as railroads or 
the AT&T telephone monopoly.  By comparison, the Commission has repeatedly found 
that the marketplace for broadband services is competitive: eight out of ten households 
are in areas with at least two (and sometimes three or more) wireline broadband 
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providers to choose from.18  When one adds the promise of high-speed wireless 
broadband, which today‟s smart phones hint is just around the corner, it is difficult to 
see why competitive forces and traditional antitrust law are insufficient to prevent 
anticompetitive behavior. 
But even assuming that broadband providers satisfied the traditional definition of 
a common carrier, the proposed net neutrality regulations would fail because they 
impose a far greater burden on these providers than traditional common carriage would.  
The essence of common carriage is to provide service to all comers at just and 
reasonable rates.  A traditional common carrier cannot unreasonably refuse to serve a 
customer.  But it may charge different rates for different levels of service, a practice 
known as “tiering”, as long as it offers similar choices at similar rates to similarly-
situated customers.  For example, the U.S. Postal Service, which is perhaps the 
quintessential common carrier, must carry virtually all mail but may charge different 
rates for bulk mail, first-class mail, and priority or express services.   
Yet most versions of net neutrality would, as a practical matter, prohibit the 
tiering of Internet service.  Networks have a limited amount of bandwidth, as anyone 
who has experienced network congestion can attest.  Adding bandwidth not only takes 
time; it is an expensive proposition. Broadband providers argue that, in the event of 
network congestion, they should be permitted to enter into agreements with Internet 
content providers that would grant priority access to the network to those who are willing 
to pay.  In other words, they should be permitted to sell “priority” or “express” delivery 
guarantees over their networks.  To certain application providers, such as those who 
provide telemedicine or real-time video conferencing over the Internet, network 
congestion can be tremendously disruptive.  Such providers therefore may be willing to 
pay a premium to guarantee a higher level of service than competitors whose products 
are less sensitive to network congestion.  Yet net neutrality would prohibit these 
agreements, even if broadband providers offered tiered access to all comers willing to 
pay the premium rate.  Because net neutrality restricts broadband providers far more 
than the common law would, the Fifth Amendment would bar such restrictions without 
compensation even if one considers broadband providers to be common carriers. 
The Need to Avoid A Serious Constitutional Question 
Of course, under sound principles of administrative law, broadband providers 
need not have an airtight Takings Clause claim to stop the Commission from pushing 
forward with its agenda unilaterally.  Because the issue presents a serious constitutional 
question, the Commission should reconsider its decision to promulgate net neutrality 
restrictions without a clear mandate from Congress.  As a general matter, the deference 
that courts normally grant to agencies is inapplicable where the agency‟s action raises 
serious constitutional issues.  As the Supreme Court has explained, 
Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits 
of Congress‟[s] power, we expect a clear indication that Congress 
intended that result.  This requirement stems from our prudential desire 
not to needlessly reach constitutional issues and our assumption that 
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Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret 
a statute to push the limit of congressional authority.19  
This canon of constitutional avoidance carries particular importance in the 
context of the Takings Clause, because a successful claim would require the payment 
of just compensation and thus would raise separation-of-powers concerns.  Only 
Congress may appropriate funds from the Treasury.  The Commission, of course, is not 
an extension of Congress.  It is an independent agency whose governing board is 
appointed by the Executive Branch.  As the D.C. Circuit has explained, granting 
“deference to agency action that creates a broad class of takings claims, compensable 
in the Court of Claims, would allow agencies to use statutory silence or ambiguity to 
expose the Treasury to liability both massive and unforeseen.”20  Where, as here, 
“administrative interpretation of a statute creates such a class, use of a narrowing 
construction prevents executive encroachment on Congress‟s exclusive powers to raise 
revenue and to appropriate funds.”21 
At the very least, Loretto presents a “serious constitutional question” for the 
Commission and other net neutrality proponents.  When coupled with the First 
Amendment implications discussed by others and the D.C. Circuit‟s ongoing express 
concern about the limits of the Commission‟s authority, the Commission would be better 
served to seek explicit congressional approval before carrying the net neutrality project 
forward.  A congressional debate on net neutrality would invite a much broader dialogue 
on the issue and would place the ultimate decision in the hands of politically-
accountable representatives from across the country rather than five Commissioners 
who are largely insulated from the political process.  
A legislative stamp of approval would assuage any separation-of-powers 
concerns should the government ultimately be required to pay just compensation for 
taking broadband providers‟ property: Congress would have clearly decided that this 
policy is important enough to stake part of the treasury on it if required.  Equally 
importantly, it would alleviate the D.C. Circuit‟s concerns that the Commission “act only 
pursuant to authority delegated to [it] by Congress.”  Without such authority, the court is 
likely to continue viewing the Commission‟s efforts with skepticism, while the serious 
constitutional question presented by the Fifth Amendment could prove fatal to the 
initiative on judicial review. 
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